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This paper links the two nascent economic literatures on social networks and cultural 
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social network exhibits a sufficient degree of interconnectedness. When the model is extended 
to allow an expanding acquaintance set, convergence is guaranteed provided a weaker 
interconnectedness condition is satisfied, and convergence is rapid. If the intensity of 
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when agents prefer to interact with people like themselves and hastened when interaction with 
dissimilar agents is preferred. 
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 Workings of the Melting Pot: Social Networks and the Evolution
of Population Attributes
by
Jan K. Brueckner and Oleg Smirnov*
1. Introduction
After early pioneering work in sociology, research on social networks has been a growing
focus of economists. Following the important papers of Jackson and Wolinsky (1996) and
Bala and Goyal (2000), one branch of the literature analyzes the endogenous formation of
network linkages. The goal is to determine the network structure that emerges in equilibrium,
while also appraising its eﬃciency (see Jackson (2004) for a survey). A second branch of the
literature, which views the network as exogenously ﬁxed, analyzes the connection between
network structure and interactive behavior such as information exchange and learning. The
relevant research is surveyed by Goyal (2003).1
Another nascent literature, which is tangentially connected to the research on learning in
networks, focuses on cultural assimilation in heterogeneous societies. The goal is to investigate
the evolution of population attributes in models where parents must invest resources in order
to transmit a cultural identity to their children, overcoming external socialization inﬂuences.
Using such an approach, Bisin and Verdier (2001) derive conditions under which population
heterogeneity is a long-run equilibrium, with assimilation not occurring. By contrast, K´ onya
(2002) shows in a related model that a minority group will be assimilated (remain distinct)
when its initial population share is small (large).2
Borrowing elements from both these literatures, the goal of the present paper is to analyze
the eﬀect of social networks on the evolution of population attributes, which occurs as agents
interact via the network. As in the second branch of the network literature, the pattern of
network linkages is exogenously speciﬁed, with individuals who are directly linked called “ac-
quaintances.” Exogeneity of the network is matched by an equally simple assumption regarding
the lawof motion of population attributes, w hich does not involve in any economic decisions
1by individual agents. In particular, agent i’s attributes, which are summarized by a scalar vari-
able θi, are inﬂuenced by the attributes of his acquaintances, as follows: i’s attributes at time
t +1equal the average attributes among his acquaintances at time t. Under one assumption,
this averaging includes the agent himself, but alternatively, the agent’s attributes at time t+1
may not depend on their previous value. This lawof motion embodies the natural viewthat
the social, political and cultural traits of individual agents tend to evolve toward the traits of
the people they know.
The goal of the analysis is to investigate the long-run evolution of population attributes
under this simple lawof motion and to showhowit depends on the structure of the social
network. The analysis demonstrates that, if the social network is suﬃciently interconnected,
in several senses to be made precise below, then population attributes converge to a “melting-
pot” equilibrium. In such an equilibrium, the attributes of all agents are identical and equal to
the mean of the population’s initial attribute values. When the interconnection requirement is
not satisﬁed (a result of simultaneous violation of two suﬃcient conditions), then a melting-pot
equilibrium may not be reached. Instead, population attributes may vary across agents, while
cycling over time. These results, which are derived by drawing on the theory of irreducible
matrices, demonstrate the workings of the melting pot in the simplest possible framework.
Although the basic model assumes that an agent’s set of acquaintances remains constant,
the ﬁrst extension of the model allows the acquaintance set to grow over time. In particular,
an individual’s acquaintance set at time t+1 is assumed to consist of his time-t acquaintances
along with the acquaintances of these acquaintances at time t.T h u s , i n e a c h p e r i o d , t h e
acquaintances of i’s last-period acquaintances are added to his acquaintance set. The analysis
shows that, when acquaintance sets expand according to this rule, convergence to a melting-
pot equilibrium occurs as long as the social network satisﬁes a minimal interconnectedness
condition. In addition, a numerical example shows that convergence is rapid compared to the
basic model.
While the basic model is devoid of any economic behavior, with the network and the
lawof motion lacking any endogenous elements, such elements are introduced in the second
extension of the model. In that extension, the intensity of interaction is a choice variable
2whose determination depends on agents’ attitudes toward dissimilar individuals. One possible
assumption is that people interact more intensivelywith agents likethemselves.3 Alternatively,
diversity could be valued, with the strength of interaction rising with the dissimilarity of
acquaintances. The lawof motion is then modiﬁed so that an agent’s attributes at time t +1
are an interaction-intensity weighted average of the attributes of his acquaintances at time t.
Although general results are not available for this modiﬁed model, numerical examples show
that, when melting-pot convergence occurs, it happens more slowly than in the basic model
under the ﬁrst interaction assumption and faster under the second.
It is important to note that the analysis in the paper does not focus on any of the economic
consequences of melting-pot convergence, which might be considered in a more comprehensive
model. The nature of such consequences could be inferred from the survey paper of Alesina and
La Ferrara (2004), which reviews the economic literature on the eﬀects of racial diversity. The
empirical part of that literature shows that one impact of racial diversity is to reduce economic
growth, both at the country and subnational levels. If such an eﬀect also applies to a more
general set of population attributes like that considered in this paper, then, by homogenizing
the population, melting-pot convergence produces economic beneﬁts. Such beneﬁts could be
captured in a more extensive model.
The plan of the paper is as follows. Section 2 analyzes the basic model, while section 3
develops the extensions. Section 4 oﬀers conclusions.
2. Basic Analysis
2.1. The acquaintance matrix
The population consists of m agents, and the attributes of each individual are summarized
by a scalar variable, as explained above. The characteristics of agent i at time t are denoted
θt
i,i =1 ,...,m.
Each agent is acquainted with other agents in the population, and the pattern of acquain-
tances is captured by the variables nij,f o ri  = j. If agent i is acquainted with agent j,t h e n
nij = 1, while if the agents are unacquainted, then nij = 0. Given the symmetry of acquain-
tances, it follows that nij = nji.T h e v a r i a b l e s nii have a diﬀerent status since they refer
3to an agent’s relationship to himself. Accordingly, the cases where nii =1a n dnii =0a r e
both considered, with the interpretation of the latter case provided below. The number of
acquaintances for agent i equals qi =
 m
j=1nij,wh e r e i himself is counted as an acquaintance
if nii = 1. It is assumed that qi > 0 for all i. Finally, the acquaintance pattern is summarized
by the symmetric matrix N, which has representative element nij. In the following discussion,
N will be referred to as the raw acquaintance matrix.
A key assumption in the analysis is that the matrix N is irreducible. This assumption
means that any two agents are linked indirectly by a sequence of acquaintances through other
people, even though the agents may not be acquainted themselves. Formally, irreducibility
means that, for all (i,j), N
(k)
ij > 0 holds for some k>0, where this expression refers to
element (i,j)o ft h ekth power of the matrix N (the resulting matrix is Nk). As seen from
discussion below, N
(k)
ij equals the number of paths of length k connecting agents i and j
via other agents. Therefore, the irreducibility requirement means that each pair of agents is
connected by a path of some length.
To see the relationship between connecting paths and the powers of N, consider the fol-


































The acquaintance pattern in N would be generated if the agents were arrayed on circle, being
acquainted with their immediate neighbors (note that agents 1 and 5 are adjacent and that all
the nii’s are set to zero for illustrative purposes). Since all agents are connected by some path
around the circle, the given N is irreducible.
Looking at N2, the fact that element (1,3) equals 1 indicates that there is a single path of
length 2 between agents 1 and 3. This path is of the form 1−2−3, with agent 1 connected to
3 via his acquaintance with 2 and 2’s acquaintance with 3. Similarly, the single path 1−5−4
exists between agents 1 and 4, and the two paths 1 − 2 − 1a n d1− 5 − 1 exist between
agent 1 and himself. However, the remaining zeros in the ﬁrst row of N2 indicate that there
4are no paths of length 2 between agents 1 and 2 or between agents 1 and 5. Raising N to an
additional power, yieldingN3, would eliminate these zeros, indicating the existence of length-3
paths between these pairs of agents. In this fashion, the irreducibility assumption says that
element (i,j)o fNk cannot be zero for all possible values of k.4
As an example of a rawacquaintance matrix that is not irreducible (i.e., reducible), consider
t h ec a s ewh e r e N is a block diagonal matrix. In this case, the population is divided into
separate groups (indicated by the blocks), between which linkages are absent. The zero oﬀ-
diagonal blocks remain zero as the matrix is raised to higher powers, indicating failure of the
requirement of irreducibility.
2.2. The law of motion for population attributes
As explained in the introduction, the evolution of population attributes is determined by
a simple rule in the basic model. In particular, agent i’s attributes at time t + 1 equal the
average attributes at time t among his acquaintances (which may include himself). The law











Note that when nii = 1, this rule says that agent i’s attributes at time t +1a r eab l e n do f
his own attributes and those of his other acquaintances at time t. By contrast, when nii =0 ,
agent i’s time-t attributes play no role in determining his attributes at time t+1, which depend
only on the attributes of his (other) acquaintances. In the ensuing discussion, an agent will be
called “self-referential” if nii = 1, indicating that his future attributes depend on their current
value.
To rewrite the law of motion from (2) in more compact form, let A denote the row-
normalized acquaintance matrix (shortened to “acquaintance matrix” in the ensuing discus-
sion). This matrix is generated from the rawacquaintance matrix by dividing each element of
the ith rowof N by the rowsum, w hich equals qi,f o ri =1 ,...,m. A representative element
of A is then nij/qi ≡ aij. Thus, if the ﬁrst rowof N contains four 1’s and m − 4 zeros, then
ﬁrst rowof A has a 1/4 in each of the spots where N has a 1, and zeros elsewhere. It is easy
5to see that if the rawacquaintance matrix is irreducible, as assumed, the same property holds
for the matrix A.




j, the lawof motion can be
rewritten in matrix form as
θt+1 = Aθt, (3)
where θt+1 is the column vector (θt+1
1 θt+1
2 ··· θt+1
m )  and θt is deﬁned analogously.
Suppose that the evolutionary process for attributes starts at time zero. Then with suc-
cessive substitutions, (3) becomes
θt = Atθ0, (4)
where θ0 =( θ0
1 θ0
2 ··· θ0
m)  is the population attribute vector at time zero and At is the tth
power of the acquaintance matrix. If the evolutionary process converges to a limit, the limiting
attribute vector is given by
limt→∞ θt = θ∗ ≡ A∗θ0, (5)
where
A∗ = limt→∞ At, (6)
which must exist for the process to converge.
2.3. Analysis of convergence
To analyze convergence, it is useful to initially focus on the case where each individual has
the same number of acquaintances, with qi equal to a constant q for all i.I n t h i s c a s e , t h e
symmetry of N is preserved under normalization, with A equal to N divided by q. Then, to
investigate the limit of At, it is useful to write the acquaintance matrix in diagonalized form.
To do so, let λi, i =1 ,...,m, denote the eigenvalues of A,wh i c ha r ea s s u m e dt ob ed i s t i n c t
(given symmetry of N, these eigenvalues are real). Then, in standard fashion, A can be written
as SDS−1,wh e r e S is a matrix whose columns are the eigenvectors of A, and where D is a
matrix whose diagonal elements equal λi, i =1 ,...,m, and whose oﬀ-diagonal elements equal
6zero. With this representation of the acquaintance matrix, At can be written as5
At =( SDS−1)(SDS−1)(SDS−1)···(SDS−1)=SDtS−1. (7)
Symmetry of A means that, S−1, the inverse of the matrix of eigenvectors of A,i ss i m p l y
equal to the transpose of that matrix, S . As a result, (7) can be written




























where Si is the ith eigenvector (the ith column of S).6
To make use of (8), key facts about irreducible matrices can be invoked. First, the Perron-
Frobenius Theorem and its corollaries state that the largest eigenvalue of an irreducible matrix
lies between the maximum and minimum row sums of the matrix. Since row-normalization
makes the rowsums of A all equal to unity, it follows that A’s largest eigenvalue equals 1.
Second, no eigenvalue of A exceeds 1 in absolute value. Third, A may have a second eigenvalue
equal to −1, but all other eigenvalues are less than one in absolute value (see Seneta (1973),
ch. 1). When A has an eigenvalue equal to −1 , it is known as a cyclic matrix, for reasons that
will become clear below. When a −1 eigenvalue does not exist, A is a noncyclic matrix.
C o n s i d e rt h ec a s ewh e r e A is noncyclic, and let the unitary eigenvalue correspond to λ1.
Then, since the remaining eigenvalues are all less than one in absolute value, λt
i converges to
zero for i =2 ,...,m. As a result, the last m− 1 columns of the ﬁrst matrix in (8) themselves
converge to zero, so that the matrix converges to (S1 00··· 0). The matrix product in (8)
then converges to S1S 
1,a nm × m matrix.
To evaluate this matrix, the eigenvector corresponding to the unitary eigenvalue must be
found. This is a simple matter, however, since it is easily seen that the equation Ax =1 x is
satisﬁed by the unit vector x =( 11··· 1) ,g i v e nt h a tA is rownormalized. Dividing this
7vector by
√
m to give it unitary length, S1 can be written ( 1 √
m
1 √
m ··· 1 √
m) .A sar e s u l t ,





1/m 1/m ··· 1/m
1/m 1/m ··· 1/m
·· ·




Using (5), it follows then that



































the mean attributes of the population at time zero.
Thus, when A is noncyclic, the evolutionary process for population attributes converges to
a “melting-pot” equilibrium. In this equilibrium, attributes are uniform across the population,
with each agent having attributes equal to the average initial value.
To understand howthis convergence occurs, consider three agents, i, j and k, and suppose
that i and k are unacquainted but that i − j and j − k acquaintance links exist. Since j’s
attributes therefore depend on k’s while at the same time inﬂuencing i’s attributes, it follows
that i partly adopts k’s attributes as the population evolves, even though the two agents are
not acquainted. When A is noncyclic, this process leads to a melting-pot equilibrium.
To analyze the cyclic case, let λ2 denote A’s −1 eigenvalue. Because λt
i still converges to


























8as t becomes large, where S2 is the eigenvector corresponding to λ2. Thus, attributes for
any given agent will oscillate around the value θ
0
, with the vector S2S 
2θ0 successively added






) as time progresses. Since it can be shown that
the mean attribute level remains constant at θ
0
during the evolutionary process when A is
symmetric, the elements of S2S 
2θ0 must diﬀer in sign.7 As a result, the oscillation will be
unsynchronized for diﬀerent individuals, with attribute values stepping up for some agents as
they step down for the others.
Thus, rather than converging to the stable, uniform value of the melting-pot equilibrium,
population attributes in this cyclic case never settle down, cycling over time while showing
nonuniformity across agents. Summarizing yields
Proposition 1. Suppose that each agent has the same number of acquaintances and
that the acquaintance matrix A is irreducible. If A is noncyclic, then population at-
tributes converge to a melting-pot equilibrium, where attributes for each agent are equal
to the mean initial value in the population. If A is instead cyclic, a melting-pot equilib-
rium is not achieved, with population characteristics cycling over time and exhibiting
nonuniformity across agents.
Nowconsider the case w here the number of acquaintances diﬀers across agents. In this
case A, does not share the symmetry of N, which means that the simpliﬁcation that leads
from (7) to (8) is unavailable. A conclusion similar to Proposition 1 can be established,
however, by appealing to the general result of Seneta (1973). His Theorem 1.2 shows that,
when A is noncyclic, θt converges to S1rS 
1lθ0,wh e r e S1r and S1l are right and left eigenvectors
corresponding to the unitary eigenvalue. S1r is the same as the eigenvector ( 1 √
m
1 √
m ··· 1 √
m) 
from above, while the left eigenvalue satisﬁes S 
1lA = S 
1l. Note that while the positive elements
in a rowof A are the same (equal to 1/qi for row i), nonuniformity of the qi’s means that the
positive elements in a given column of A will diﬀer. As a result, the left and right eigenvectors
need not be equal. Observe, however, that in the previous case where A is symmetric, S1r =
S1l ≡ S1 holds and Seneta’s Theorem 1.2 can be used directly to reach (9) and (10).
9Substituting for S1r, the expression S1rS 














































































where S1l,i is the ith element of S1l. In (13), ˆ θ0 is some weighted sum of the θ0
i values, which
does not necessarily equal the mean value. Summarizing yields
Proposition 2. When the number of acquaintances diﬀers across agents and A is
irreducible and noncyclic, then population attributes again converge to a melting-pot
equilibrium, with attributes uniform across the population but not necessarily equal to
the initial mean. When A is cyclic, the melting-pot equilibrium is not achieved.
Note that in the latter case, the time path of attributes is not given explicitly (as in (12)), but
it is clear from (7) that attributes will cycle over time and not necessarily exhibit uniformity
across the population.
2.4. The social network and convergence
Whether or not a melting-pot equilibrium is achieved depends on the eigenvalues of A,a n d
their magnitudes in turn depend on the characteristics of the social network. Insight into this
connection can be gained through the notion of the period of an irreducible matrix, denoted d.
If the acquaintance matrix A is noncyclic, then it has d = 1. A cyclic matrix has d>1, but
for an irreducible, row-normalized matrix like A, d equals 2.8
A’s period depends on the periods of its indices, i =1 ,2,...,m. The period of index i,
denoted di, is the greatest common divisor of those k values for which A
(k)
ii > 0. Recall that
A
(k)
ii denotes the ith diagonal element of the kth power of matrix A. For example, if A
(k)
ii > 0
holds for all even k’s starting with 6 (k =6 ,8,10,...), then di = 2. Similarly, if A
(k)
ii > 0h o l d s
for all k ≥ 2, then di = 1. A key property of any irreducible matrix is that all its indices have
the same period, which then gives the period d of the matrix.
It can be diﬃcult to determine the period of a particular acquaintance matrix without
actually computing its powers. However, in some general cases, it is easy to verify that a
10matrix has d = 1, establishing noncyclicality. Two such cases, where a melting-pot equilibrium
is guaranteed to emerge, are considered in the following discussion. The next section then
presents numerical examples illustrating these cases as well as a cyclical case.
To explore the ﬁrst noncyclical example, suppose that some agent j is self-referential.
Recall that this property means that njj = 1, so that, under the lawof motion in (2), agent
j’s time-(t + 1) attributes depend partly on his attributes at time t.S i n c enjj = 1, it follows
that ajj, the corresponding diagonal element of A, is positive. As result, the inner product of
the jth rowof A and the (identical) jth column, which gives A
(2)
jj , contains the term a2
jj > 0.
Since the nonnegativity of all the elements of A means that any remaining terms in this inner
product are nonnegative, it follows that A
(2)
jj > 0. But with this diagonal element positive,
the inner product of the jth rowof A and the jth column of A2 again produces a positive
value, which equals A
(3)
jj > 0. Continuing this progression, it is clear A
(k)
jj > 0h o l d sf o ra l l
positive k, implying that dj = 1. This conclusion in turn implies that d = 1 and hence that A
is noncyclic, yielding
Proposition 3. If at least one agent is self-referential, then A is noncyclic and the
evolution of population attributes leads to a melting-pot equilibrium.
This conclusion is intuitively sensible given that pure mimicking behavior, where agents
just look to others as attributes evolve, would appear to raise the possibility of an unstable
evolutionary process. Remarkably, though, it takes just one agent to be self-referential, and
thus “grounded” by his own attributes, to get convergence to a melting-pot equililbrium. In
the next section, a numerical example shows that universal mimickry, where no agent is self-
referential, can generate the cyclical case.
To develop the second noncyclical example, suppose that no agent is self-referential, so
that A has zero diagonal elements. But suppose that two agents, say 1 and 2, are aquainted
with each other and that both are acquainted with a common third person, agent 3. Then A
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(note that no assumptions are made about the structure of A outside of its upper corner).




























where e, f and g are nonnegative values. Since the ﬁrst three elements of (15) are positive,
while the ﬁrst three rows of A each have two of their ﬁrst three elements positive, it follows
that the ﬁrst column of A3 has the form of (15), with the ﬁrst three elements again positive.
Continuing this progression, it follows that the ﬁrst three elements of Ak’s ﬁrst column are
always positive for k ≥ 2. As a result, the diagonal element A
(k)
11 is positive for k ≥ 2, which
implies d1 = 1 and hence d = 1. Since agents 1, 2 and 3 were chosen arbitrarily, this argument
yields
Proposition 4. If any two agents are acquainted with a third common agent, then A is
noncyclic and the evolution of population attributes leads to a melting-pot equilibrium.
The existence of common acquaintances clearly makes the population more integrated,
facilitating the blending of attributes across agents. As in the case of Proposition 3, however,
only one case of such integration is needed to ensure convergence to a melting-pot equilibrium.
The implication of Propositions 3 and 4 is that convergence to a melting-pot equilibrium
in the model can be expected under a wide variety of social-network structures. The network
needs just one self-referential agent or two individuals with a common acquaintance to rule out
12the nonconvergence outcome. The weakness of these requirements suggests that convergence
is the natural outcome under the model.
2.5. Numerical examples
This section presents numerical examples to illustrate some of the points developed above.
Consider a setting with 10 agents, each of whom is self-referential and has two additional









































Recall that this acquaintance pattern would be generated if the agents were arrayed on circle,
being acquainted with their immediate neighbors. Finally, suppose that an agent’s initial
attribute value is equal to his index, so that θ0 = ( 1234567891 0 )  .
The evolutionary process for this base case is shown in Table 1. Since each agent has 3
acquaintances, while the existence of self-referential agents ensures converge to the melting-pot
equilibrium, Proposition 1 applies. As can be seen, attributes converge to 5.50, the mean of
the initial values, by period 100.9
Table 2 shows the eﬀect of making each agent non-self-referential, which means that all
the diagonal elements of N in (16) are set equal to zero. Convergence is not guaranteed in this
case, and as can be seen from the table, convergence indeed does not occur. Once t reachs 64,
the attributes of each agent cycle back and forth between 5.00 and 6.00 as t increases further.
At each point in time, attributes are non-uniform across the population, indicating the absence
of a melting-pot outcome.10
To illustrate Proposition 3, Table 3 shows the eﬀect of making agent 1 self-referential, which
means setting N’s ﬁrst diagonal element to 1 while leaving the others at zero. Consistent with
13the predictions of the Proposition 3, Table 3 shows convergence to a melting-pot equilibrium
by t = 125.11 However, since the number of acquaintances is now non-uniform (with agent 1
having 3 and the other agents having 2 acquaintances), convergence is to an attribute value of
5.28, which less than the mean value of 5.50.
Finally, Table 4 illustrates Proposition 4 by setting all N’s diagonal elements to zero but
assuming that agent 1 is acquainted with agent 3 as well as agents 2 and 10, so that both
agents 1 and 2 have 3 as a common acquaintance. This change means setting the (1,3) and
(3,1) elements of N to 1, as in the case illustrated in (14) (recall, however, that (14) shows A,
not N). As predicted by Proposition 4, Table 4 shows convergence to a melting-pot equilibrium
by t = 100, but given non-uniform aquaintance numbers, convergence is again to an attribute
value less than the initial mean.12
2.6. Attribute evolution when N is reducible
It is instructive to brieﬂy consider case where N is block diagonal and thus reducible.
Recall that in this case, linkages between the groups corresponding to the blocks are absent,
so that N
(k)
ij =0f o ra l lk when (i,j) represents an entry in one of the zero oﬀ-diagonal blocks.
In this case, it is easy to see that, as long as the submatrices corresponding to the individual
diagonal blocks are themselves irreducible and noncyclic, convergence to a “localized” melting-
pot equilibrium occurs within each block. In other words, for each agent within a given block,
attributes converge to the initial block average. For example, keeping the structure of the
numerical examples above, suppose that N has two blocks corresponding to i =1 ,2,3,4a n d
i =5 ,6,7,8,9,10. Then attributes for agents in the ﬁrst and second blocks converge to θ =2 .5
and θ =7 .5 respectively, provided that the corresponding block submatrices are irreducible
and noncyclic.
It is interesting to note, however, that creation of just one link between the groups repre-
sented by the diagonal blocks makes N irreducible, leading to global melting-pot convergence.
For example, if agents 4 and 5 are acquainted, which converts the (4,5) and (5,4) elements of
the two zero blocks from 0’s to 1’s, then convergence to a melting-pot equilbrium occurs.13
14Table 1
Attribute Evolution in the Base Case
tθ 1 θ2 θ3 θ4 θ5 θ6 θ7 θ8 θ9 θ10
0 1.00 2.00 3.00 4.00 5.00 6.00 7.00 8.00 9.00 10.00
3 4.70 3.48 3.37 4.00 5.00 6.00 7.00 7.62 7.51 6.29
10 5.24 4.82 4.67 4.83 5.24 5.75 6.16 6.32 6.17 5.75
30 5.48 5.45 5.44 5.45 5.48 5.51 5.54 5.55 5.54 5.51
64 5.49 5.49 5.49 5.49 5.49 5.50 5.50 5.50 5.50 5.50
65 5.49 5.49 5.49 5.49 5.49 5.50 5.50 5.50 5.50 5.50
100 5.50 5.50 5.50 5.50 5.50 5.50 5.50 5.50 5.50 5.50
125 5.50 5.50 5.50 5.50 5.50 5.50 5.50 5.50 5.50 5.50
Table 2
Attribute Evolution When No Agents are Self-Referential
tθ 1 θ2 θ3 θ4 θ5 θ6 θ7 θ8 θ9 θ10
0 1.00 2.00 3.00 4.00 5.00 6.00 7.00 8.00 9.00 10.00
3 6.00 3.25 4.25 4.00 5.00 6.00 7.00 6.75 7.75 5.00
10 4.75 5.75 4.61 5.61 5.00 6.00 5.38 6.38 5.24 6.24
30 4.99 5.99 4.99 5.99 5.00 6.00 5.00 6.00 5.00 6.00
64 5.00 6.00 5.00 6.00 5.00 6.00 5.00 6.00 5.00 6.00
65 6.00 5.00 6.00 5.00 6.00 5.00 6.00 5.00 6.00 5.00
100 5.00 6.00 5.00 6.00 5.00 6.00 5.00 6.00 5.00 6.00
125 6.00 5.00 6.00 5.00 6.00 5.00 6.00 5.00 6.00 5.00
15Table 3
Attribute Evolution When Only Agent 1 Is Self-Referential
tθ 1 θ2 θ3 θ4 θ5 θ6 θ7 θ8 θ9 θ10
0 1.00 2.00 3.00 4.00 5.00 6.00 7.00 8.00 9.00 10.00
3 4.70 3.38 3.83 4.00 5.00 6.00 7.00 6.75 7.33 5.13
10 5.00 5.02 4.74 5.17 5.06 5.69 5.44 5.94 5.37 5.50
30 5.25 5.33 5.20 5.37 5.17 5.40 5.18 5.39 5.20 5.34
64 5.27 5.30 5.26 5.31 5.25 5.32 5.25 5.31 5.26 5.30
65 5.29 5.26 5.30 5.25 5.31 5.25 5.31 5.25 5.30 5.26
100 5.28 5.28 5.29 5.27 5.29 5.27 5.29 5.27 5.29 5.28
125 5.28 5.28 5.28 5.28 5.28 5.28 5.28 5.28 5.28 5.28
Table 4
Attribute Evolution When Agents 1 and 2 Are Both Acquainted
with Agent 3
tθ 1 θ2 θ3 θ4 θ5 θ6 θ7 θ8 θ9 θ10
0 1.00 2.00 3.00 4.00 5.00 6.00 7.00 8.00 9.00 10.00
3 4.77 3.38 3.48 4.33 4.83 6.00 7.00 6.75 7.50 4.80
10 4.75 4.82 4.86 4.96 5.19 5.60 5.44 5.91 5.19 5.42
30 5.16 5.18 5.16 5.20 5.14 5.24 5.13 5.25 5.13 5.21
64 5.18 5.18 5.18 5.18 5.17 5.18 5.17 5.18 5.17 5.18
65 5.18 5.18 5.18 5.17 5.18 5.17 5.18 5.17 5.18 5.17
100 5.18 5.18 5.18 5.18 5.18 5.18 5.18 5.18 5.18 5.18
125 5.18 5.18 5.18 5.18 5.18 5.18 5.18 5.18 5.18 5.18
163. Extensions
This section considers two extensions of the model. Under, the ﬁrst extension, an agent’s
set of acquaintances grows over time rather than being ﬁxed. Indirect linkages produce new
acquaintances in each period, with agents becoming acquainted with the acquaintances of their
acquaintances. The second extension allows individuals to choose the intensity of interaction
with their acquaintances. The law of motion in (2) is then amended so that an agent’s attributes
at time t+1 are equal to an intensity-weighted average of his acquaintances’ attributes at time
t.
3.1. The eﬀect of an expanding acquaintance set
Suppose that an agent’s set of acquaintances expands over time through indirect linkages.
To formalize this expansion, let the set of agent i’s acquaintances at t = 0 be denoted by
Ω0
i,wi t hΩ 0
i = {j | nij =1 } (note that this deﬁnition potentially includes i himself). Then,
suppose that agent i’s acquaintance set at t = 1 consists of the individuals in Ω0
i plus the
time-zero acquaintances of the agents in Ω0
i.T h u s ,
Ω1
i = {j | j ∈ Ω0
i or j ∈ Ω0
s for s ∈ Ω0
i}. (17)
Thus, agent i’s acquaintance set at t = 1 includes the acquaintances of his acquaintances at
t = 0. The acquaintance set expands in each period according to this rule, so that the agent
i’ ss e ta tt i m et + 1 is deﬁned recursively by Ωt+1
i = {j |j ∈ Ωt
i or j ∈ Ωt
s for s ∈ Ωt
i}.
To represent the evolving acquaintance set in terms of the rawacquaintance matrix, recall
the initial discussion of irreducibility in section 2.1. That discussion showed that element
(i,j) of the matrix N2 equals the number of paths of length 2 between agents i and j via i’s
aquaintances. Thus, all individuals j who are acquaintances of i’s time-0 acquaintances are
identiﬁed by positive values in the ith rowof N2.A s a r e s u l t , i f N2 is added to N itself,
the ith rowof the resulting N + N2 matrix has positive elements for agents who are time-0
acquaintances of i or acquaintances of i’s time-0 acquaintances.14
Let the matrix N + N2, which applies to t = 1, be denoted P1, and consider the matrix
P2 ≡ P1 + P2
1. By the above reasoning, the ith rowof this matrix has positive elements
17for agents who are time-1 acquaintances of i or acquaintances of i’s time-1 acquaintances.
Substituting for P1 yields P2 = N +2 N2 +2 N3 + N4. Generally, by using the recursion rule
Pt+1 = Pt + P2
t , it is easy to see that Pt follows the pattern of P2, being equal to a weighted
sum of all the powers of N up to the power 2t. As a result, element (i,j)o fPt is equal to
a weighted sum of the (i,j)e l e m e n t so fNk for k =1 ,2,···2t. But since irreducibility of N
means that N
(k)
ij > 0 holds for some value of k, it follows that this sum must be positive for a
suﬃciently large value of t. This fact in turn implies that all the elements of Pt are positive
when t is suﬃciently large.
Positivity of Pt implies a particular form for the row-normalized acquaintance matrix at
time t.T h i sm a t r i xi sd e n o t e dBt, and it is derived from Pt by setting all the positive elements
equal to 1 and then rownormalizing the resulting matrix. Since all elements of Pt are positive
when t is large, it follows that, for large t, Bt is a matrix with each element equal to 1/m.
To use this fact to make a statement about convergence, let   t denote the critical value of
t beyond which Pt is positive (  t is the smallest t  such that Pt > 0f o rt ≥ t ). It is easily
seen that   t ≤ m, the dimension of N.15 Next, note that the previous lawof motion from
(3) is rewritten as θt+1 = Btθt,wi t h Bt taking the place of the constant acquaintance matrix
A. Then observe that, based on this lawand the form of Bˆ t, θ













i/m, the mean attribute value at t =   t. But since θ
ˆ t+1 has identical elements,
it follows that θ
ˆ t+2 = θ






)  and that θt remains constant at this value for
all subsequent t’s. Thus, convergence occurs no later than   t (and thus no later than t = m),
yielding
Proposition 5. With an expanding acquaintance set, convergence to a melting-pot
equilibrium occurs for any social network where N is irreducible.
The intuition underlying this result is that, when the acquaintance set expands, every agent
must eventually become acquainted with everyone else, provided that the initial raw acquain-
tance matrix N is irreducible. Once this state is reached, the lawof motion equates all
attributes to a particular mean value, which is then propagated forward.
Numerical examples can illustrate Proposition 5 along with some other features of the
18evolutionary process under an expanding acquaintance set. Accordingly, suppose that the
four diﬀerent N matrices from the examples of section 2.4 are again relevant, but that the
acquaintance set expands using the above rules.
The ﬁrst key feature of the numerical examples is that, under all four cases considered
above, convergence to a melting-pot equilibrium occurs. Since the second case considered in
section 2.4 was nonconvergent, this diﬀerence illustrates Proposition 5, showing that conver-
gence occurs with an expanding acquaintance set even when A is cyclic.
The second notable feature of the examples is that in the third and fourth cases (where
one agent was self-referential or two agents had a common acquaintance), convergence is to
a diﬀerent value of θ than in section 2.4. Attributes converge to melting-pot values of 5.33
and 5.30 in the third and fourth cases, respectively, values that are slightly larger than those
reached in the previous examples. However, since attributes in the base case converge to 5.50
in both the basic and expanding-acquaintance models, these limits under the two models may
sometimes be same.16
Table 5
Attribute Evolution With an Expanding Acquaintance Set
tθ 1 θ2 θ3 θ4 θ5 θ6 θ7 θ8 θ9 θ10
0 1.00 2.00 3.00 4.00 5.00 6.00 7.00 8.00 9.00 10.00
1 4.33 2.00 3.00 4.00 5.00 6.00 7.00 8.00 9.00 6.66
2 5.00 4.00 3.66 4.00 5.00 6.00 7.00 7.33 7.00 6.00
3 5.44 5.33 5.29 5.33 5.44 5.55 5.66 5.70 5.66 5.55
4 5.50 5.50 5.50 5.50 5.50 5.50 5.50 5.50 5.50 5.50
Consistent with the above discussion, the examples show ﬁnally that expansion of the
acquaintance set leads to much more rapid convergence to a melting-pot equilibrium. While
convergence required 100 periods in the base case of section 2.4, convergence to the melting-
pot equilibrium nowoccurs by t = 4, as illustrated in Table 5. This rapid convergence, which
19illustrates the fact that a melting-pot equilibrium is reached no later than t = m = 10, also
characterizes the three other cases, all of which converge in four periods.
3.2. Endogenous linkage intensity
Suppose that acquaintance sets are again ﬁxed but that each agent is endowed with a ﬁxed
total amount of expendable eﬀort that can be used to interact with acquaintances. Let ht
ij
denote the eﬀort spent by agent i interacting with j at time t,wi t h
 m
j=1ht
ij = 1, indicating
that available eﬀort is normalized to unity. Note that ht
ii can be interpreted as the eﬀort agent
i spends in solitary activities.
Suppose that the beneﬁt from an acquaintance depends on the attributes of the other
agent as well as the eﬀort devoted to the linkage. Let the time-t beneﬁt that agent i derives
from an acquaintance with agent j be written f(ht
ij)gi(θt
j), where f is increasing and concave
(indicating decreasing returns to eﬀort) and gi is a function whose form may depend on the







ij = 1. Note that the presence of nij in the objective function restricts attention to
those agents j who are i’s acquaintances.
To consider a simple case, suppose that f(ht
ij)=l n ( ht
ij), and let gi(θt
j)=θt
j.17 The
latter assumption says that interaction with higher-θ agents is more desirable, regardless of
the identity of agent i. In this case, it is easily seen that the ﬁrst-order conditions for the





l). This equation says that ht
ij equals the
share of θt
j in the aggregate θ value among i’s acquaintances.
Finally, let the lawof motion in (2) be amended so that the inﬂuence of acquaintances’


















Note that if all attributes are identical, then (17) reduces to (2).
The terms in parthenses in (18) multiplyingthe θt
j’s are not constants, as in (2), but instead
depend on the current attribute values in the population. As a result, under this extension of
the model, it is not possible to write a simple matrix representation of the law of motion, as
20in (3). Consequently, the theory of irreducible matrices cannot be used to analyze converge,
preventing the derivation of any general results.
Numerical examples can be generated, however, and they yield natural conclusions. Us-
ing the base-case assumptions from the previous example, it can be shown that population
attributes again converge to a melting-pot equilibrium, but the equilibrium attribute value
nowequals 7.04, w hich is higher than the previous initial-mean value of 5.50. This increase in
equilibrium attributes makes sense given that interaction with higher-θ agents is more intense
under the modiﬁed model. The qualitative properties of the other cases considered above are
unchanged, with cycling occurring in the second case and melting-pot convergence occurring
in the third and fourth cases.
Instead of assuming that agents like interacting with high-θ individuals, suppose instead
that agent i’s time-t beneﬁt from interacting with j is decreasing in the absolute diﬀerence
between θt
i and θt
j. Thus, agents prefer to interact with individuals who are like themselves,
getting the most beneﬁt in the self-referential case from spending time alone. To operationalize
this assumption, let gi(θt
j)=1 /[(θt
j −θt
i)2 +1]. After making the appropriate modiﬁcations to
(18), calculations showthat convergence to the previous melting-pot value of 5.50 occurs in the
base case, a consequence of gi’s symmetry around θt
i. However, because the individuals in this
case (who are self-referential) now spend more eﬀort in solitary activities than in interacting
with their acquaintances, the convergence process is slowed. Convergence is now achieved at
t = 122 rather than at t = 100.
Suppose instead that agents are happiest interacting with individuals most diﬀerent from
themselves. To capture this alternative, let gi(θt
j) be written as [(θt
j−θt
i)2+1]. Since agents now
interact more intensively with dissimilar individuals, the convergence of population attributes
is speeded up, with the melting-pot value of 5.50 achieved at t = 76.
4. Conclusion
This paper has linked the two nascent economic literatures on social networks and cultural
assimilation by investigating the evolution of population attributes in a simple model where
agents are inﬂuenced by their acquaintances. The main conclusion of the analysis is that
21attributes converge to a melting-pot equilibrium, where everyone is identical, provided the
social network exhibits a suﬃcient degree of interconnectedness. In one case where convergence
does not occur, the evolution of attributes is governed by pure mimickry, with the next-period
value of each agent’s attributes independent of the current value, being inﬂuenced only by the
current attributes of acquaintances. In this setting, each agent is, in eﬀect, “not connected to
himself,” violating one of the suﬃcient conditions on network interconnectedness.
When the model isextended to allowan expanding acquaintance set, convergence isguaran-
teed provided a weak interconnectedness condition is satisﬁed (irreducibility), and convergence
is rapid. If the intensity of interactions with acquaintances becomes endogenous, convergence
(when it occurs) is slowed when agents prefer to interact with people like themselves and
hastened when interaction with dissimilar agents is preferred.
The model analyzed in the paper is exceedinglysimple, and exceptfor the second extension,
it does not permit agents to make any economic decisions. Future work could attempt enrich
the framework by incorporating such decisions. One natural modiﬁcation would allow the
social network to be endogenous by including linkage decisions on the part of agents. Given
the intense current interest in social networks among economists, the payoﬀ to future work on
models like the present one is likely to be high.
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24Footnotes
∗We thank Kangoh Lee for helpful comments. Any shortcomings in the paper, however, are
our responsibility.
1For examples of the sociological research on social networks, see Granovetter (1973) and
Wasserman and Faust (1994).
2In a related paper, Bisin and Verdier (2000) study the eﬀect of marriage choices on cultural
assimilation.
3This behavior is known “homophily” in the sociology literature (see McPherson, Smith-Lovin
and Cook (2001)).
4More generally, suppose that both agents i and j are acquainted with agent s. Then, the
ith and jth rows of N have a 1 in the sth spot, and as a result, the inner product of the
ith rowand the jth column of N (which equals the jth row) contains at least one unitary
term, which counts the length-2 path between i and j via s.I fi and j are both acquainted
with a second individual k (but have no additional common acquaintances), then the given
inner product has two unitary terms, indicating the existence of 2 length-2 paths between i
and j. The result is a value of 2 for element (i,j)o fN2. Continuing the argument, if agent
j is acquainted with another agent l, then there exist at least two length-3 paths between i
and l (via s and j and via k and j). This fact is reﬂected in the inner product of the ith row
of N2 and the lth column of N, which has a 1 in its jth spot. This inner product, which
equals element (i,l)o fN3, is at least 2, indicating the existence of at least 2 paths of length
3 between i and l.
5This discussion follows Strang (1976, ch. 5).
6The equality S−1 = S  follows from the fact that the eigenvectors of a symmetric matrix are
orthogonal, which in turn yields S S = I,wh e r e I is the identity matrix (the eigenvectors
are normalized to have unit length). To establish orthogonality, premultiply both sides of
the equation ASi = λiSi by S 
j to yield S 
jASi = λiS 
jSi. Then transpose both sides of
the equation ASj = λjSj and postmultiply by Si to yield S 
jA Si = λjS 
jSi.W h e n A is
symmetric, the LHS terms of the second and fourth equations are equal, implying equality
of the RHS terms. But since eigenvalues are non-zero and λi  = λj, this equality requires
S 
iSj =0 .
7The constancy of the mean attribute level can be demonstrated by recalling that eigenvectors
25associated with A’s unit eigenvalue are proportional to the unit vector. Thus, consider the
vector   S1 =( 1
m, 1
m ··· 1
m) , which satisﬁes A  S1 =   S1 and hence   S 
1A =   S 
1.A s a r e s u l t ,
  S 
1Aθt =   S 
1θt = θ
t
,wh e r e θ
t
is the mean attribute value at time t. But, using the law
of motion θt+1 = Aθt, it then follows that θ
t+1
=   S 
1θt+1 =   S 
1Aθt = θ
t
.T h u s , t h e m e a n
attribute level is constant over time and equal to θ
0
for all t.
8See Seneta (1973, ch. 1) for a discussion of the period concept and related results.
9At t = 100, equality of attributes holds to the 5 signiﬁcant digits generated by the computer
program leading to Table 1.
10The absence of self-referential agents does not always lead to cyclic behavior. For example,
it can be shown that if the number of agents is odd rather than even, convergence to θ
0
occurs.
11Convergence at the 5-signiﬁcant digit level, however, does not occur until t passes 300.
12Convergence at the 5-signiﬁcant digit level does not occur until t passes 190.
13In another interesting case, the social network contains a “key player,” who is acquainted
with many other agents, as in Ballester, Calv´ o-Armengol and Zenou (2004) (Brueckner
(2004) considers a similar case). To investigate the key-player case, let the N matrix in (16)
be modiﬁed by assuming that one individual k is acquainted with all the other agents, while
the other agents only have individual k as an acquaintance. With all agents assumed to be
self-referential, the kth rowand column of N are then vectors of 1’s, with the remaining
diagonal elements also equal to 1. Numerical examples using such a matrix expose two
regularities. First, convergence to a melting-pot equilibrium is rapid, occurring in about 20
periods. Second, the melting-pot attribute value lies between the mean initial attribute level
and the key player’s attribute value. Note that fast convergence means that the non-unitary
eigenvalues of N in the key-player case are small in absolute value.
14Note that some agents may belong to both groups.
15The reason is that any non-repetitive path between two agents (or between an agent and
himself) can never be longer than m, which implies that all agents must be connected once
m periods have elapsed.
16Although attributes converge to the mean initial value in the basic model when the number of
initial acquaintances is the same across agents, this outcome may not be a general property
26of the expanding-acquaintance model despite the evidence of the numerical example. If it
were possible to establish that Bt is symmetric for all t, then the argument of footnote 7
could be used to showthat the mean attributes are constant over time. This conclusion in
turn would imply that the common attribute value reached in the expanding-acquaintance
melting-pot equilibrium equals the initial mean value. However, even though it is possible
to establish that Pt for t ≥ 1 is symmetric and has a constant rowsum, it does not appear
possible to establish the constancy of the rowsum of the (symmetric) incidence matrix of Pt
(thus, the number of acquaintances may diﬀer across agents for t ≥ 1). As a result, each row
of this incidence matrix need not be divided by the same number in generating Bt,wh i c h
means that the latter matrix may not be symmetric.
17Note that since ht
ij < 1, the objective function is negative given use of natural log function.
This is a scaling issue, however, that can be ignored.
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